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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM
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June 2, 1977 Conference
List 1, Sheet 2

t-:::..-,A. .:;~ -:-·

Cert to CA
(Peck, McCree, Lively) ~

No. 76-1334 CFH

c!2P

BORDENKIRCHER, Warden

v.

~~~
I

HAYES, Prisoner

Federal/Habeas

Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. J:Cl (1969) and Blackledge v.
u~s.

Timely

Applying this Court's decisions in No!!b_ { ~

1. · SUMMARY:

417

.

21 (1974), CA 6 held that the prosecutor violated

~.~
due ~

process when he secured an indictment under an habitual-offender
statute after a state defendant refused to plead guilty to a
less serious offense.
2.

FACTS:

The Warden seeks certiorari.

Resp was
e~suing

plea

.

the prosecutor warned resp that if he did not plead guilty,
-

"'---"="

"-------'

he would be charged under the habitual criminal statute,

________________

which carried a life
,,____sentence.
~~

Resp refused and insisted

on going to trial on the forgery count.
thereupon secured an indictment against
habitual offender statute.

The prosecutor
~esp

under the

Resp was convicted on both

counts, and, pursuant to the trial judge's instructions,
was sentenced by the jury to a mandatory life sentence.
...____

---------

-

Kentucky appellate courts affirmed the conviction

The

over resp's

due-process claim.
Resp then sought federal habeas relief.

The District

Court (E.D.Ky.)(Moynahan, J.) denied relief, concluding
simply that resp assumed the risk of a life sentence:
"[T]he petitioner chose to risk
the maximum sentence of life imprisorunent under the Kentucky habitual criminal statute by elect~
ing to proceed to trial, rather
than accepting a sentence of 5
years in return for a plea of
guilty to the forgery charge .... "
Petn, at 2f.
CA 6 reversed.

The court, per Judge McCree, held that

the plea-bargaining process had been impermissibly abused by
~-------------------------------------------------------the prosecutor's
attempt "to coerce an unwilling defendant

---

---------------~---------------------------------------into foregoing
his constitutional right to trial." Id., at
4a.

The prosecutor's actions in this case, the court con-

*/

eluded, were plainly based on vindictiveness;- accordingly,
~I

During sentencing . proceedings, the prosecutor inquired
of resp: " ... isn't it a fact that I told you that if you did not
intend to save the court the ... necessity of a trial ... that I intended to return to the grand jury and ask them to indict you
based upo.n these prior felony convictions?" Id., at 3a n. 2.

(

"we hold that due process has been offended by placing [resp]
in fear of retaliatory action for insisting upon his constitutional right to stand trial." . Id., at 7a.
3.

CONTENTIONS:

CA 6, in the Warden's view, has im-

properly hampered the plea-bargaining process.

Admitting that

the prosecutor attempted "to create natural coercive impact on
the accused ... ", the Warden contends that the "vindictiveness"
and "coercion" in this case were no greater than similar pressures operating on criminal defendants at other stages of the
criminal process.
Resp replies that the decision below is consistent with
Blackledge and Pearce, which hold that defendants who assert
procedural rights must be treated in a manner that avoids any

(~

suggestion of vindictive or retaliatory motives.
4.

DISCUSSION:

fours with this case.

Neither Pearce nor Blackledge is on all ~~~
Those decisions govern instances where

the prosecutor has occasion to reindict the accused because
the latter has exercised some procedural right; those cases
therefore presented the spectacle of judges or prosecutors
upping the ante once a defendant had already been subjected
to a full . trial and eventually succeeded in avoiding the
conviction by virtue of exercising a procedural right.
That is not the case here.

Resp went through the system

only once; thus, the prosecutor used his entire arsenal against
resp the first time around.

Moreover, the very same result

could have been achieved, again with only a

singl~

trial, had

the prosecutor simply procured the multiple-offender indictment

at the outset and then used the more serious offense as
leverage to secure resp's plea to the lesser charge.

Since

that procedure would have been above reproach, CA 6's result is wedded to the entirely fortuitous circumstances of
this case.

Next time, the prosecutor can avoid the due-process

holding, while maintaining his leverage in the plea-bargaining
process, simply by securing both indictments at the same time.
That is a very long-winded way of saying that, at bottom,
CA 6 may simply be exalting form above substance.
Caveat:

It is my

unde~standing

that due process is

indeed concerned with "form" as well as with substance.

Black-

ledge and Pearce, after all, were based on the "appearance",
not the certainty, of vindictiveness on the part of prosecutors or judges.

If, then, it violates due process for prose-

cutors to act in a way that can reasonably be viewed as a
vindictive response to the exercise of a constitutional or
statutory right, then the Kentucky prosecutor here violated
due process.
There is a response and a motion to proceed ifp.
5/21/77

Starr

Ops in petn

I
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Bordenkircher v. Hayes

This memo will record my initial reaction (tentative
at this stage) after reading the briefs and the opinion of CA6
(McCree) .
Respondent was convicted of being an habitual
criminal under Kentucky's recidivist statute that carried an
automatic life sentence.

He was indicted on the charge of

uttering a forged check for about $88, an offense that carried
a penalty of from two to ten years.
against respondent was

w

over ~ helming.

Apparently, the evidence
During pretrial

conferences with the prosecuting attorney at which
respondent's counsel was present, the prosecutor offered to

-==

....-..._.. .-.

~

:ws

recommend a five-year sentence if respondent pled guilty.

In

these plea bargaining negotiations, the prosecutor advised
respondent that if he elected not to plead guilty, he would be
charged under the habitual criminal statute.

Respondent chose

not to plead guilty, and the prosecutor thereupon obtained a
new indictment.

The second indictment differed from the first

in that Count 2 thereof charged respondent with being an
"habitual criminal".

Respondent previously had pled guilty

2.

to a charge of "detaining a female against her will for the
purpose of having carnal knowledge of her", and was sentenced
to seven years; and also had been convicted of robbery (see
App. 12). *
After exhausting state remedies in which the issue
now before was duly raised, respondent sought federal habeas
corpus relief.

This was denied by the district court.

That

court also refused to issue a certificate of probable cause to
permit an appeal because the Court thought the "appeal would
be frivolous and not taken in good faith" (Pet for Cert 2a).
CA6 reversed on the merits, holding that respondent had been
denied due process by the plea bargaining tactics of the
prosecutor:
Although a prosecutor may in the course of plea
negotiations offer a defendant concessions relating
to prosecution under an existing indictment, see
United States ex-re l. wifl lam v. McRann, 436 F.2d 103
(2d Cir. 1970), cert den1ed, 402 U.S. 914 (1971), he
may not threaten a defendant with the consequences
that more severe charges may be brought if he insists
\ on going to trial. When a prosecutor obtains an
indictment less severe than the facts known to him at
the time might permit, he makes a discretionary
determination that the interests of the state are
served by not seeking more serious charges. Cf.
United States v. Johnson, 537 F.2d 1170 (4th Cir.
1976). Accordingly, if after plea negotiations fail,
he then procures an indictment charging a more
serious crime, a strong inference is created that the
only reason for the more serious charge is
vindictiveness. Under the circumstances, the

* Respondent was convicted of robbery on January 18, 1971,
sentenced to five years, but was placed on probation. He was
charged with uttering a forged instrument on November 20,
1972, while he was on probation.

3.

prosecutor should be required to justify his action.
In this case, a vindictive motive need not be
inferred. The prosecutor has admitted it. Pet for
Cert. 7a
The reference above to the prosecutor admitting a
"vindictive motive" apparently refers only to the conceded
fact that the prosecutor had specifically advised respondent
and his counsel that unless the guilty plea was entered, the
prosecutor would "return to the grand jury and ask them to
indict you based upon these prior felony convictions".
CA6 relied primarily upon North Carolina v. Pierce,
395 U.S. 711 and Blackledge v. Perry, 417

u.s.

21.

Although

these cases are not irrelevant, I do not view them as being in
any sense dispositive of the present issue.

In both Pierce

and Blackledge the prosecutor had reindicted an accused
following conviction in a trial that was overturned by the
exercise of a constitutional right.

Here, there had been no

prior trial, and the prosecutor merely "bargained" on the
basis of the state's right to indict for a more serious
offense.
I thought initially that the case was not too
important, as it seemed to me that prosecutors could avoid its
holding simply by indicting initially for the offense that
carried the most severe penalty.
Conference merely to "join 3".

I therefore voted at
Upon further reflection, I am

inclined to view the case more seriously.

As I read CA6's

4.

opinion, it enunciates a per se rule that would substantially
curtail the flexibility of a prosecutor in plea bargaining
discussions.

Moreover, as indicated in the amicus brief filed

by the Attorney General of Texas, there is now a square
conflict with the Fifth Circuit case of Montgomery v. Estelle,
decided February 25, 1977, although the mandate in that case
was vacated and the case set for future oral argument.
Petr's brief, after emphasizing the now recognized
utility of plea bargaining, points out that prosecutors
attempt to structure a case so that the defendant is
encouraged to plead guilty rather than elect to go to trial.
It is common knowledge that th ~ already overloaded system
could collapse if a significantly larger percentage of
defendants elected jury trial.

If prosecutors were compelled

by the CA6 rule always to indict for the maximum possible
penalty, the gap between the state's demand (in this case it
would have been life) and a plea of not guilty presumably
would have been more difficult to bridge than the difference
between ten years and not guilty.

Putting it differently, I

would think it in the interest of defendants generally - as
well as expediting the business of the courts - if prosecutors
were encouraged to indict for lesser offenses.
In any event it seems to me that the per se rule of
CA6 goes too far.
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Vindictive Prosecutor, o ~~ ~ e There Any Limit s How Far a
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Prosecutor Can Go in Plea Bargaining?"
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I do not mean t~ b~ overly sarca~ tic, but the

~ ~ . ..... ~ ,.,.,W.,...tl'-:lt.-lf',._C..C..C~---

prosecutor's actt o~s - ~ n~ motives in this case affront even •
my relatively conservative sense of justice.

If the Court

meant what it said in Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742,
to the effect that there are limits to what is permissible
in plea bargaining, then this is the case in which to
enforce a limit.

l

2.

I.

Facts

The facts deserve some elaboration, because they
are not treated adequately in the briefs.

These additional

facts are not critical to resp's claim, but they emphasize
(if it needs any additional emphasis) that the prosecutor's
decision to re-indict resp under the habitual criminal
statute was not based on a legitimate exercise of
prosecutorial discretion in evaluating society's interest,
but rather was an attempt to get resp to relinquish his
right to a trial and to punish resp for his assertion f
constitutional rights after resp insisted on having a trial.
In the original indictment, resp was charged with
one count of uttering a forged instrument.

He had

presented a forged check for $88.30 to the cashier at a
grocery store.

Uttering a forged instrument carries a

penalty of 2-10 years imprisonment.

The prosecutor offered

resp a 5-year sentence if he would plea guilty.

Resp

insisted on his innocence ("Why do you want to put pressure
on me to cop-out before a trial of something that I didn't
do?" App. 43) •

The state may have had overwhelming

evidence against him, but the Fifth Amendment guarantees
resp's right to insist that he did not commit the crime and
to put the state to its proof.
The prosecutor threatened resp that if he insisted
on going to trial, and thereby refused to save the state
inconvenience and time, resp would be reindicted as an

3.

habitual offender.

Conviction under the habitual offender

statutes carries a mandatory life sentence.

The two

previous crimes of which resp had been convicted were

~ detaining a female against her will for the purpose of
having carnal knowledge of her"

a~bbery.

The circumstances of the two prior crimes are
reveale d in resp's testimony in the state trial court.
Resp was 17 years old when he participated in the
commission of the first crime, detaining a female.
pleaded guilty and was sent to

He

reformatory, not prison.

-

Resp told the jury that at the time of the rape resp was
involved with three other "guys", one of whom was sentenced
to life.

Resp testified, "I was seventeen years old and

just passing through this place and they involved me in it,
you know."

App. 44.

It is impossible to know what resp's

role was, but the fact that he was sent to a reformatory
while one of the other participants was given life suggests
that his role was mi no r .

For the second crime (robbery)

resp was placed on probation; he served no time.
These facts are relevant to evaluating the
prosecutor's initial decision not to charge under the
habitual criminal statute.
McGree reasoned that

In this opinion below Judge

4.

?
App. 89.

"[w]hen a prosecutor obtains an indictment less
severe than the facts known to him at the time
might permit, he makes a discretionary
determination that the interests of the state are
served by not seeking more serious charges.
[citation omitted] Accordingly, if after plea
negotiations fail, he then procures an indictment
charging a more serious crime, a strong inference
is created that the only reason for the more
serious charges is vindictiveness."
It seems clear on the facts of this case that the

prosecutor's initial decision not to proceed under the
habitual criminal statute was a sound exercise of
discretion, based on an assessment that resp really does
not come within the category of criminals who should be

.

locked up for life.

Indeed, when the prosecutor

cross-examined resp at trial about his knowledge of the
meaning of "habitual criminal", resp insisted that he had
no idea it could mean someone like him, because he had seen
many convicts in the reformatory who had been "six-time
losers" and had not been charged as habitual criminals.
This is not to say that the prosecutor was not legally
entitled to charge under the habitual criminal statute,
which clearly was applicable, but that the prosecutor most
likely recognized that the statute should not be applied to
resp.
Indeed, the inappropriateness of treating resp as
an habitual criminal and imposing a mandatory life sentence
subsequently was recognized by the Kentucky legislature.
The New statute - which regulates "persistent felony
~

offender sentencing" - applies

5.

"only if, for each of two previous felony
convictions, the sentence was at least one year;
defendant was imprisoned under each such sentence
before commission of the instant felony; and the
offender was over eighteen years at the time he
committed each offense.
[Resp] would not have
been subjected to enhanced sentencing under [the
new statute] because none of these conditions were
satisfied."
CA opinion, App. 84 n. 1.
II.

The Decision Below

From reading your Aid-to-Memory, I gather that you
believe the decision below goes too far, in that it
establishes a "per se rule".

I take it that that rule is

that a prosecutor may not "bring an habitual offender
indictment against a defendant who has refused to plead
guilty to an indictment for the same unenhanced substantive
offense", at least when "the prosecutor does not assert
that any event occurred between the issuance of the first
indictment and the issuance of the second to influence his
decision except [the defendant's] insistence upon his right
to trial."

CA opinion, App. 88.

unreasonable about such a rule.

I do not see anything
Of course, it must be

justified by a holding that due process has been violated
by the prosecutor's actions, which will be discussed
below.

But I view the holding of the court below as

sufficiently narrow and tied to the facts of this case.

It

does not even prohibit all instances of "upping the ante";
it just applies to bringing an additional charge that
carries a mandatory life sentence.

Rather than the

6.

incremental steps normally associated with bargaining,
bringing such a charge injects a qualitative different
coercive element into the plea bargaining situation.
III.

Due Process

In Santobello v. New York, 404

u.s.

257, the Court

recognized that although plea bargaining may afford
advantages to both the prosecution and the accused, "all of
these considerations presuppose fairness in securing
agreement between an accused and a prosecutor."
261.

Id. at

And in Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, which

upheld the validity of a guilty plea despite the fact that
it might have been entered into out of fear of the death
penalty that the Court later held unconstitutional because
of its deterrence of Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights, the
Court explicitly distinguished that case from "the
situation where the prosecutor or judge, or both,
deliberately employ their charging and sentencing powers to
induce a particular defendant to tender a plea of guilty."
Id. at 751 n. 8.

This case presents that very situation.

Much language in several distinct but related
lines of cases supports - and perhaps compels - resp's
position and the decision of the court below.

Resp and the

three California amici quote practically all of the
relevant passages in their briefs, primarily from the
guilty plea

7.
)

cases

1

and from North Carolina v.

v. Perry.

~~arce and Blackledge

The reasoning in these different lines of cases

is concerned with different problems, but they coalesce in
this case.
A.

The Guilty Plea Cases

One would think that this line of cases would be
the most helpful in analyzing the issue presented here,
since they deal with the permissible limits of plea
bargaining.

Yet there is a critical difference between

this case and the guilty plea cases:
guilty.

Resp did not plead

He "unreasonably" (in the state's words) insisted

on going to trial, despite the fact that by doing so he
subjected himself to imposition of a mandatory life
sentence.

In the guilty plea cases, the defendant pleaded

guilty and later attacked the validity of the plea on
grounds of involuntariness or coercion.

The argument, with

several variations on the same theme, was that the plea was
coerced and therefore involuntary because the defendant

.

really had no choice.
In United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, the
Court held the capital punishment portion of the Federal
1. By the "guilty plea cases" I mean the Brady trilogy,
Brady v. United States, 397 u.s. 742; McMann v. Richardson,
397 U.S. 759; Parker v. North Carolina, 397 u.s. 790; and
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 u.s. 25. Also relevant is
Santobello v. New York, 404 u.s. 257.

8.

Kidnapping Act unconstitutional because it placed an
"impermissible burden" on the defendant's right to a jury
trial.

Yet in Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742,

decided after Jackson but involving a guilty plea entered
before Jackson, the Court held that the defendant's
election to plead guilty rather than face the possibility
of the death penalty was not involuntary.
(per White, J.) stated:

The majority

"That the statute caused the plea

in [a 'but for'] sense does not necessarily prove that the
plea was coerced and invalid as an involuntary act."

u.s.

at 750.

397

The Court reasoned that the decision to

obtain leniency and avoid the death penalty was, in the
absence of threats or mental coercion, rational.2
The Court rejected Brady's theory of
involuntariness, which the Court described as follows:
"Brady's claim is of a different sort:
that it
violates the Fifth Amendment to influence or
encourage a guilty plea by opportunity or promise
of leniency and that a guilty plea is coerced and
invalid if influenced by the fear of a possibly
higher penalty for the crime charged if a
conviction is obtained after the State is put to
its proof."
Id. at 750-51.

The Court rejected this theory because it

would undermine much of the advantage, conferred on
prosecutor and accused alike, of plea bargaining:

2.
Indeed, this
the instant case
the overwhelming
before a jury."

"we

is the corollary of the state's comment in
that resp "unreasonably chose, in view of
evidence against him, to stand trial
Petr's brief at 15-16.

9.
cannot hold that it is unconstitutional for the State to
extend a benefit to a defendant who in turn extends a
substantial benefit to the State and who demonstrates by
his plea that he is ready and willing to admit his crime
and to enter the correctional system.
753 (emphasis added) .

." 397

u.s.

at

The Court followed the Brady

reasoning in Parker v. North Carolina, 397

u.s.

790, 795

("we determined in [Brady] that an otherwise valid plea is
not involuntary because induced by the defendant's desire
to limit the possible maximum penalty to less than that
authorized if there is a jury trial.") (emphasis adeed), and
in North Carolina v. Alford, 400

u.s.

25, 31.

"The standard was and remains whether the plea
represents a voluntary and intelligent choice
among the alternative courses of action open to
the defendant.
[Citing Boykin v. Alabama, 397
U.S. 238, and Machibroda v. United States, 368
u.s. 487.] That he would not have pleaded except
for the opportunity to limit the possible penalty
does not necessarily demonstrate that the plea of
guilty was not the product of a free and rational
choice • • . . "
I glean two points from the guilty plea cases.
The first is the Court's repeated emphasis on the presumed
fairness of the plea bargaining, meaning (a) that the
prosecutor does not use his charging power to force or
induce the defendant to plea guilty and (b) that if the
plea bargaining process is legitimate, it is because there

10.

are mutual benefits to the prosecutor and the accused.

Of

course the prosecutor always had the upper hand, but the
Court's mention of the clearly guilty defendant's desire to
avoid the agony of trial and to obtain a more lenient
sentence, and the reference to mutual "exten[sions] of
benefit" suggest that the defendant is supposed to get
something out of the bargaining and be better off than he
would be by going to trial on the indictment that is the
subject of the bargaining.

This is a very different matter

from ending up worse off than under the original indictment
because of an insistence on Fifth and Sixth Amendment
rights.

This point will be pursued below at p.
As to point (a), the meaning of "force" or

"induce" is not clear.

A major difference between the

majority and dissenting opinions in Brady focuses on what
this concept means.

The majority seems to limit it to

"actual or threatened physical harm or • • • mental
coercion overbearing the will of the defendant."
at 750.

397 U.S.

Mr. Justice Brennan, on the other hand, believed

this to be too restrictive a definition of involuntariness.
"[T]he legal concept of 'involuntariness' has not
been narrowly confined but refers to a surrender
of constitutional rights influenced by
considerations that the government cannot properly
introduce. The critical question that divides the
Court is what constitutes an impermissible factor,
or, more narrowly in the context of these cases,
whether the threat of the imposition of an
unconstitutional death penalty is such a factor."

11.

Id. at 802. 3

The point is that although the majority

and dissent disagreed as to what constitutes
involuntariness, they agreed that a plea would be invalid
if "induced" by the prosecutor.
Under the Court's holding in Brady, I would
imagine that the inducement in the instant case would not
have rendered resp's plea "involuntary", if he had pleaded
guilty.

--

That is, if the original indictment had charged

both counts (forgery and habitual criminal), and resp had
decided to plead guilty, an attack on the validity of that
plea would not succeed under Brady because the desire to
avoid a life sentence is not even as great as the desire to
avoid the death penalty.
But the second point I glean from the guilty plea
cases is that they are not really relevant to the instant
case for the simple reason that resp did not succumb to
whatever pressure was exerted by the prosecutor.
not plea guilty.
waiver.

He did

Some Justices might regard this as

This is not discussed in any of the briefs.

It

seems to be the implication of the prosecutor's questioning
of resp about whether he was not warned that the prosecutor
would seek a harsher indictment if resp would not plead
guilty.

But any notion that there was waiver here should

3. Mr. Justice Brennan concurred in ~rady because the
record showed that Brady had pleaded guilty for various
reasons unrelated to fear of the death penalty.

12.
not prevail.

Resp had two choices:

he could plead guilty

or he could insist on his right to trial.

By doing the

latter, he did not waive his right to claim either that the
harsher indictment is invalid under Pearce and Blackledge
v. Perry, or that a threat to indict under the habitual
criminal statute placed an "impermissible burden" on Fifth
and Sixth Amendment rights, under Jackson.

The defendants

in Blackledge and Pearce did not waive the right to
challenge prosecutorial vindictiveness by pursuing their
appeals instead of succumbing to the general fear of a
higher sentence as retaliation for the exercise of
constitutional rights.

The very point of those cases was

that even though the prosecutor did not explicitly threaten
to seek a harsher sentence the defendant's apprehension of
such action was sufficient to require a prophylactic rule.
It should not matter in the instant case that the threat
was explicit and that resp insisted on his right to trial
despite the threat.

Similarly, the defendant in Jackson

did not waive his right to challenge the
unconstitutionality of the capital punishment provision in
the Kidnaping Act, on the ground that it unnecessarily
deterred assertion of the right to a jury trial, even
though he did not succumb and went to trial.
Mr. Justice Brennan noted the anomaly of this
situation in his dissent in the Brady trilogy:

13.
"Since the death penalty provision of the
Kidnaping Act remains void, those who resisted the
pressures identified in Jackson and after a jury
trial were sentenced to death receive relief, but
those who succumbed to the same pressures and were
induced to surrender their constitutional rights
are left without any remedy at all. Where the
penalty scheme failed to produce its
unconstitutional effect, the intended victims
obtain relief~ where it succeeded, the real
victims have none.
397 U.S. at 807-08.

In my opinion, Justice Brennan's

analysis of the anomaly cannot be faulted.

In terms of

consistency, either the Brady Court should have said that
Jackson was wrongly decided, instead of limiting it in an
~

assailable fashion, or

~rady

was wrongly decided.

As

Justice Brennan says, if fear of the death penalty was an
impermissible factor in the decision to plead guilty, the
plea should be open to attack.
Since the guilty plea cases are not the most
relevant, the instant case must be analyzed in terms

-----

similar to those employed in Jackson, in conjunction with
the"------------~~--~--~-vindictiveness analysis of Pearce and Blackledge.
Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412

u.s.

17.

See

14.
B.

United States v. Jackson

In United States v. Jackson the Court struck down
the capital punishment portion of the Federal Kidnaping Act
because it imposed too great a burden on Fifth and Sixth
Amendment rights.

The statute, by requiring that a jury

recommend imposition of the death penalty, deterred
defendants from asserting the right to a jury trial.

The

Court's reasoning is worth stating at some length:
"The inevitable effect of any such provision is,
of course, to discourage assertion of the Fifth
Amendment right not to plead guilty and to deter
exercise of the Sixth Amendment right to demand a
jury trial.
If the provision had no other purpose
or effect than to chill the assertion of
constitutional rights by penalizing those who
choose to exercise them, then it would be patently
unconstitutional."
390

u.s.

at 581.

In Jackson the Court found that the

statutory scheme did serve a legitimate objective, i.e.,
avoidance of the more drastic penalty of a mandatory death
penalty.

But this legitimate objective was not weighty

enough to save the statute.

l

"Whatever might be said of Congress' objectives,
they cannot be pursued by means that needlessly
chill the exercise of basic constitutional
rights.
[Citing Robel, 389 U.S. 258: Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 u.s. 479.]
The question is not
whether the chilling effect is 'incidental' rather
than intentional: the question is whether that
effect is unnecessary and therefore excessive .
. . • The goal of limiting the death penalty to
cases in which a jury recommends it is an entirely
legitimate one. But that goal can be achieved
without penalizing those defendants who plead not
guilty and demand jury trial • • • . Congress
cannot impose the death penalty in a manner that
needlessly penalizes the assertion of a
constitutional right."

adequate safeguard existed in the judge's responsibility to
reject coerced or otherwise involuntary pleas.
"For the evil in the federal statute is not that
it necessarily coerces guilty pleas and jury
waivers but simply that it needlessly encourages
them. A procedure need not be inherently coercive
in order that it be held to impose an
impermissible burden upon the assertion of a
constitutional right."
The theory expressed in Jackson is an amalgam of
the "least restrictive alternative" theory, as indicated by
the Court's citation of Shelton v. Tucker, and the theory
of unconstitutional conditions.

See Note, The Unconstitu-

of Plea Bargaining, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 1387, 1398

-z

Although the Court has rejected the idea that plea
argaining

~ ~~

is unconstitutional, it has left open the

ossibility that beyond certain limits, plea bargaining
ractices would be unconstitutional.

It seems to me that

the unconstitutional condition analysis in the Harvard
Note, together with the least restrictive alternative

4

"The individual's assertion of his constitutional
rights may be deterred if the state makes their
exercise costly. When an individual foregoes the
exercise of a constitutional right in order to
obtain or retain a benefit from the state,
established doctrine requires that the courts
examine such an exchange to determine if it places
an undue burden of the exercise of the right and
hence is unconstitutional.

88 Harv. L. Rev. at 1398. The author goes on to
distinguish between "unconstitutional pressures that render
a plea involuntary" and "[u]nconstitutional conditions that
induce waiver". The former focuses on the defendant's
mental state; the latter involves "focuses simply on the
presence and importance of the right and the justifications
for penalizing its exercise."

16.
analysis of Jackson, suggest very strongly that the
prosecutor cannot use the complete extent of his charging
power in order to attempt to induce or compel a guilty
plea.

The focus is on the permissibility of the

prosecutor's actions and not on the subjective mental state
of the defendant, unlike the situation in the guilty plea
cases.

The prosecutor may not place an "impermissible

burden" on the exercise of a defendant's constitutional
right to demand a trial.

Chaffin,

~upra,

412

u.s.

at 35

(quoting Jackson v. United States).
C.

Pearce and Blackledge

You indicated in your Aid-to-Memory that Pearce
and Blackledge are not really on point.

That is true.

But

when Pearce and Blackledge are considered along with
Jackson and much of the language in the guilty plea cases,
the incontrovertible principle that emerges is that a
prosecutor cannot attempt to obtain a guilty plea by taking
action that is intended to force the defendant to give up

---

his rights.

-

The question of what is an "impermissible

burden" can be answered by reference to the interdiction of
vindictiveness in Pearce and Blackledge.
Much of the language in Chaffin lends support to
the idea of reading the ideas expressed in Jackson together
with the Pearce/Blackledge rationale.

The Chaffin Court

focused on Pearce's emphasis on vindictiveness and
identified the problem as "the hazard of being penalized
for seeking a new trial".
the Chaffin Court) •

412

u.s.

at 25-26

(emphasis by

This would be all the more true in a

case where the hazard faced by the defendant is of being
penalized for seeking a trial.

The personal motive of the

prosecutor is also a strong one in the guilty plea
situation.

Unlike the situation in Chaffin, where "the

jury is unlikely to be sensitive to the institutional
interests that might occasion higher sentences by a judge
desirous of discouraging what he regards as meritless
appeals", id. at 27 n. 13, the prosecutor seeking a guilty
plea is motivated by a single concern:

discouraging what

he regards as a meritless trial.
The obvious objection to this theory is that this
is what takes place in all plea bargaining.

This is the

tenor of the state's brief, which, contrary to this Court's
emphasis on the presumed fairness of most plea
negotiations, describes plea bargaining as an inherently
"coercive" process whose aim, "[b]luntly put", is "to avoid
utilizing the jury trial system established by the United
States Constitution."

Petr's brief at 22, 10.

This may be

true in practice, but the Court refused to make this
callous assumption when it placed its imprimatur on plea
bargaining.

The tenor of the Court's decisions is that

plea bargaining is permissible only so long as it is fair
and furthers legitimate objectives, one of which is
providing the defendant some benefit.

As the Chaffin Court

made plain, "Jackso!! and Pearce are clear and subsequent
cases have not diluted their force:

if the only objective

of a state practice is to discourage the assertion of
constitutional rights it is 'patently unconstitutional'
"

Chaffin, supra, 412

u.s.

at 32 n. 20.

When the prosecutor returns to the grand jury to
seek a harsher indictment after a defendant refuses to
relinquish his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights, it is
plain that the objective is to discourage the assertion of
constitutional rights.

The threat is made to induce this

defendant to plead guilty; and following through on the
threat serves as a deterrent to the exercise of these
constitutional rights by other defendants who know what
will happen if they insist on being tried.

This is the

chilling effect that was condemned in Pearce, even though
it was acknowledged there that there is no constitutional
right to an appeal.

The case for prohibiting

vindictiveness because of its effect on the right to a
trial is even greater than the case for prohibiting
vindictiveness because of its effect on appeals.
It does not matter in principle that in the plea
bargaining situation there has been no trial, and therefore
that there is no first sentence with which to compare the
allegedly vindictive action.

This makes application of the

constitutional standard more difficult, because it is not
as easy to say what is vindictive in the normal plea
bargaining situation as to identify that a higher sentence
has been imposed.

But on the facts of this case,

application of the rule is easy because the prosecutor has
conceded that he threatened and ultimately sought the
hl gher charge because resp would not plead guilty.

To the

extent that the holding of CA 6 can be regarded as a
rule, it is a justifiable and narrowly tailored rule.

~ ~~

-

When

a prosecutor does not charge under an enhancement statute,

~ r whatever reasons informed his decision that such a
-~ ~

charge would be inappropriate, it can be presumed that

~- :d ~dictiveness

is the only reason for his decision to

~~~- return to the grand jury for such a charge when the only

~~

change in circumstances is the defendant's assertion of

~ .~~stitutional

~ ~~
_,

~~

~

rights.

The reason I say the rule is narrowly tailored is

that it does not affect "plea bargaining practices such as

~ J.~~ering

~jr ·~~ r~1

r(PV ,,- -

to amend a felony count to a misdemeanor, but upon

t1on of the offer, seeking at trial the maximum

J,l\enal ty permitted for the felony offense. II

~~ 2~.

PetrI s brief at

Although petr contends that what happened in the

~~ ...i~ tant

case "pales [by] comparison" to such a situation as

~ ~J one just described, the California amici correctly note

~ ~~~
~~

that the situation described by petr is permissible because
the prosecutor has done no more than what he could have

~~one

~~ not

~

~v~~

~f·

fftV

if plea bargaining did not exist.

The prosecutor has

penalized the defendant for asserting his constitu-

tional rights.
This brings me to the fundamental distinction
between constitutionally impermissible "upping the ante"
and constitutionally permissible offering of concessions.
Resp rebuts petr's example, stated above, as follows:
"In petr's example, the maximum penalty the
defendant braves when he pleads not guilty is the
maximum penalty authorized by law for the felony
offense. If the defendant and the prosecutor
never discuss a plea bargain, the defendant by his
plea of not guilty will risk, at most, the
possibility that his conviction will result in the
imposition of the maximum sentence authorized for
the felony. If the defendant and the prosecutor

negotiate but the defendant declines to plead
guilty in return for the offered amendment of the
felony charge to a misdemeanor, the defendant,
even though he rejected the prosecutor's offer,
will still risk only the maximum penalty
authorized for the original felony charge."
It has been suggested that an affirmance in this
case will not help defendants because prosecutors will be
able to charge the enhancement offense from the outset and
thereby evade the Court's decision.

(Petr also notes that

this would have an adverse collateral consequence for the
defendant by making it harder for him to obtain bail.)

The

theory of the suggestion is that insofar as addition of the
enhancement statute cannot be viewed as vindictive, because
the defendant has not yet asserted any constitutional
right, it will not be prohibited by Pearce.
correct assessment, as far as it goes.

That is a

It will be an open

question whether the prosecutor can charge under an
enhancement, statute despite his view of its
inappropriateness in the particular defendant's case,
simply to gain leverage in order to obtain a guilty plea.
My own opinion, based on all the cases discussed above, is
that a prosecutor could not use his charging power in this
manner, not because of Pearce but because of the
impermissible burden on the assertion of constitutional
rights, along the lines suggested by Jackson.
This question need not be addressed in order to
decided this case.

The Court would be justified in making

the assumption that prosecutors act in good faith and would
not attempt to evade a constitutional obligation by

bringing unwarranted charges simply to obtain bargaining
leverage.

Some leverage is necessary, of course, and is

built into the system.

But that leverage supposedly is the

ability to make concessions to a defendant, not the ability
to extort a guilty plea.

At least under the Court's

statements about the legitimacy of plea bargaining, there
is a very real difference between a prosecutor's offer of
concessions and his threats to "up the ante" if the
defendant will not relinquish his constitutional rights.

IV.

Remedy

The CA ordered the case remanded to the district
court "with instructions to order petitioner's discharge
except for his confinement under a lawful sentence imposed
solely for the crime of uttering a forged instrument."
am not sure what this means.

I

I assume it means that resp

is required to serve the ten years to which he could have
been sentenced on the forgery count.

If so, and since resp

has not cross-petitioned from the CA's judgment, it would
not be open to him to request better relief.

5 See Note, Guilty Plea Bargaining: Compromises by
Prosecutors to Secure Guilty Pleas, 112 u. Pa. L. Rev. 865,
885-86 (1964):
"The practices employed to induce guilty pleas
should be channelled by prosecutors into those
areas which create a minimal danger of coercion .
. . • A prosecutor's discretion to charge multiple
counts, where proper, should not be
circumscribed. But a prosecutor should not
include additional charges merely to bring
pressure on a defendant to plead guilty."

--'

TheCA's language is ambiguous, however, and could
be construed to mean that resp should be resentenced.
\

At

oral argument, it might be a good idea to ask resp's

l counsel

what relief he thinks resp was granted.

V.

Conclusion

The Court's decision in the instant case can be
quite narrow.

No general rule need be stated; the Court

can hold simply that the prosecutor here engaged in conduct
that violated the guarantee of due process of law by
attempting to coerce a guilty plea by threatening to obtain
an habitual offender indictment that the prosecutor
initially thought was not justified.

The only change in

circumstances between the two indictments was the
defendant's assertion of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment
rights.

Once resp refused to plead guilty, the decision to

seek a much harsher indictment must be viewed as motivated
by vindictiveness under Pearce.

From the perspective of

the plea negotiations before resp refused to plead guilty,
the threat to seek the habitual offender indictment was an
"unnecessary and therefore excessive" use of the charging
power calculated "needlessly [to] penalize the assertion of
a constitutional right", which amounted to "an
impermissible burden upon the assertion of a constitutional
right".

Jackson v. United States, supra.
The Court need not address the question whether a

prosecutor can bring stepped-up charges at the outset when
the only reason for doing so is to obtain overwhelming

leverage

6

in order to induce a defendant to relinquish

his constitutional rights.

(Neither must the Court address

the difficult question of what kind of proof a defendant
would have to present to prevail on such an allegation.)
The Court may assume that prosecutors will act in good
faith in deciding what to charge.

N.B.

6 I say "overwhelming" leverage because, at least in this
case, the prosecutor had adequate leverage within the
sentencing range of the forgery charge. using the habitual
offender charge was needless because (a) for someone like
resp, who was determined to go to trial no matter what, the
additional pressure was bound to be unavailing; and (b) for
the more usual defendant, the potential of facing ten years
instead of five would have been adequate to cause him to
make a rational decision in favor of pleading guilty.

76-1334 BORDENKIRCHER v. HAYES

'f.,e.~ ' ~4.--M.4o411

<='~

Argued 11/9/77

"' ~

C4t4 •.... 1M

••

.f.c4u ,_,._,1

~

~

I

~ ~

I

~ ~ ~ ~tl-.&«444~·

..e

~461J~
.$~ AA.~e..L ~ fo.c-..-:e-cu~
'
'
,, ~~·~.. -r ~f
, ~ . ''(~
~~ IA•~~./J,~

~~) ~ ~~<~<=hc.cetAi;,

51"?

3 ..

•

J!!ilt

,

N

~ ~~ .. 4-~'L #--( ~ ~ Q'SIA"'-r""'IIU1~~~ ,,
~ ~--ce-e«h.., ~ ~ ...,~ .. ~ >L-c ~ ~.,,_,_
J

•

..

~

.

4., •.......c.. -,
~ A -

,~
,~
~

~ ~'"-s.• .a

~-~ ~..a-~~,c~L}-&=~.
·~ ~ju..c,~~

i

•

~ ·~~~~~. ~~
t!.tA.- ~~;;

to:-

~~

(t!L...~~UUJ ~ ~~ ~~~
~ A.-T iJ ~ ~W..; ~) ~~~--

~

5~:~~~~

:::::> } ~~~ ~~·.-~···<-"'
It

.

~~(~,)

S ~ A-4--'.cr...t

~

.

~·-t.t ~ ~ ~

rkJ ~·~
~ ~ ~ ~,&~.,~ .· ICJ ~
K
~ .
(A~...........-;....,_,. ,,~,~

-~~~~;..r-rl~f~

~ ~ ~ ~.Q.,v' ~)

~t.:t

,. ~~

~~~~~~~~
~ e...-c.«-c.- ~ ~~~.;.../

w:u.

~~ UcJ... ~~ ~

~kM-~~~~ ~ ~ _.,.,.f.U-~ ;._.

~p-V-~io~

~~·

~~

~~~k__~
- t- .e , ~ 'L'-'~ .. ~:U~ .
~

(
76-1334 BORDENKIRCHER v. HAYES
The · Chief Justice JZ&#"~--<._

Conf. 11/11/77

-

p~~~bcd.~ ~~~~.

..

'?..L?.e~ ~.,~~ ~ -r·~~s ~·
~/..·,.~t-4 c.4e.~4~~.

-

~ ~ ~ ~ ~-~ .~;z::,v.. - ~h... c..:f)--~
~ ~ ~ P--•".d"4Z1 UA ~...., ~ ~
~..#A,,..,~-c4'~

.

Mr. Justice Brennan q-~~

Mr. Justice White

.lf Ll

~~~""'C.ete ,._,.

:

~~ ~ ?_...ctzr

t .... J • .,

~ Ll

~t..t- wa--.- c. ~4~ J 4u,_ ~ ~ ?'-zl..t.~r4 ..~
~~ '1 ~ }JI.AJ ~ t~~.<-)1

?~~~~~~

~~. ~"-4~

)~~

P-~~~ t,._ v-a-v~ ~~

wr~
~.,£..,Pfc.~··,
~~ .

Mr. Justice Blackm~

;tJ._

i.l.)

~--~

k..~ -_/,....,.~
.-~c..U; ~
....

~

__,.

~.

"1- ~ ·~ ~ <4f .. ft..l,~~

~.~ ~~A.;f-ii.J.,~
-~~t~As~,

VIA-

~~~-~-~--r c,q.' ~~
H-u._ ·1- ~h ~ - ~ ~

~ ~

.

~ ~-4 .:c..-t- ~--~J-

k-~'1~~~4

.

)

Mr. Justice Re hnquist

~•' ~

)

Mr. Justice Stevens

---------- --- ---------- -----~---------- ·· -

5"y.~.__ ~ k~~~

~ ~4A·~

To: '

~:-

t

Pr.
Hr.

/ r

Mr. Ju'"'t•!
'to~~..> ....
Mr. Ju..;t cu 2 'v,,s

From: Mr. Ju::rt 1

:.,

~'" )wart

C1rcu1atcd 'DEC 21. lfjff -

1st DRAFT

Rec rc ..... .:..t..., .....

·SUPREME COURT OF THE UNlTED

-- -- - -

STAT~

No. 76-1334
Don Bordenkircher. Superintendent,
On Writ of Certiorari to
Kentucky State Penitentiary,
the United States
Petitioner,
Court of Appeals for
v.
the Sixth Circuit.
Paul Lewis Hayes.
[January -, 1978]

(JL~~

MR. JusTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question in this case is whether the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment is violated when a state prosecutor carries out a threat made during plea negotiations to
reindict the accused on more serious charges if he does not
plead guilty to the offense with which he was originally
.charged.

7:::~

I
The respondent, Paul Lewis Hayes, was indicted by a
Fayette County. Ky., grand jury on a charge of uttering a
forged instrument in the amount of $88.30, an offense then
punishable by a term of two to 10 years in prison. Ky. Rev.
Stat. ~ 434.130 (repealed 1974). After arraignment. Hayes,
his retained counsel. and the Commonwealth's attorney met
in the presence of the clerk of the court to discuss a possible
plea agreement. During these conferences the prosecutor
offered to recommend a sentence of five yea.rs in prison if
Hayes would plead guilty to the indictment. He also said that
if Hayes did not plead guilty and "save the court the inconvenience and necessity of a trial ," he would return to the
·grand jury to seek an indictment under the Kentucky Habitual

~~
wz:u. fl. c;.
A

J;t_e

/

~

~

~
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Criminal Act,' then Ky. Rev. Stat. ~ 431.190 (repea.Jed 1975).
which would subject Hayes to a mandatory sentence of life
imprisonment by reason of his two prior felony convictions. 2
Hayes chose not to plead guilty. and the prosecutor did obtain
an indictment charging him under the Habitual Criminal Act.
It is not disputed that the recidivist charge was fullv justified
by the evidence. that the prosecutor was in possession of this
evidence at the time of the original indictment. and that
Hayes' refusal to plead guiltv to the original charge was what
led to his indictment under the habitual criminal statute.
A jury found Hayes guilty on the principal charge of uttering a forged instrument and. in a. separate proceeding, further
found that he had t·wicc before been convicted of felonies. As
required by the habitual offender statute. he was sentenced to
a life term in the penitentiary. The Kentucky Court of
Appea.ls rejected Hayes' constitutional objections to the
enhanced sentence. holding in an unpublished opinion that
imprisonment for life with the possibility of parole was constitutionally permissible in light of the previous felonies of which
While croSl;-examining Haw~; during thr subsequent trial procerdings
the prosecutor described the plea offer in the following lnngungr:
"Isn't. it a fact thnt I told you 11t that time rthr initial bargninin~r session]
thnt if you did not intend to plead guilty to fivr ~·rar, for this chargr
and ... ~>nve thr rouri thr inronveniencr nne! necessit~· of n trial and
tr1king up this timr that I intrndcd to rrturn to the grand jury and nsk
them to indict you ba:;rd upon thesr prior felon~· ronvirtion;.; ?"
~At tlw time of Hnw"' trial thr statute nrovided tlwt "ralny person
convicted a ... third time of frlonv ... shnll br roJ,fined in the penitmt.inry during his life." Kv. Rrv. Stat. § 431.090 (repralPd 1975). Thnt
f;tntute has been replarrd b~· 1\\. Rrv. Stat.~ 532.080 (1977 ~unp.) under
which HnyeR would have bren Rentenred to. nt mo. ·t. an indeterminntc
trrm of 10 to 20 yrar~. §532.80R (6)(b). In nddition. undrr the new
stntute n. previous ronviC'tion i:; a bn~is for enhanr('d f:rntencing only if a.
pri~on term of one ~·ear or more wa:; impo8rcl. thr ~entrnce or probHtion
wns rompleted within five yrars of the prr:::rnt ofT('n~e., nne! thr offender
was over thr age of 18 whrn thr offent:r wa~ committrd. At lrnst onr or
Haye~;' prior ronvlctions did not meet thesr ronditions. See n. 2, infra.
1
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·H ayes had been convicted," and that the prosecutor's decision
to indict him as a.n habitual offender was a legitimate use of
available leverage in the plea bargaining process.
On Hayes' petition for a federal writ of habeas corpus, the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky agreed that there had been no constitutional violation
in the sentence or the indictment procedure, and denied the
writ.~ The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed
the District Court's judgment. While recognizing "that plea
bargaining now plays an important role in our criminal justice
system." the appellate court thought that the prosecutor's
conduct during the bargaining negotiations had violated the
principles of Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U. S. 21. which "protect[ ed] defendants from the vindictive exercise of a prosecutor's discretion." Hayes v. Cowan, 547 F. 2d 42. 44.
Accordingly, the court ordered that Hayes be discharged
"except for his confinement under a lawful sentence imposed
solely for the crime of uttering a forged instrument." 547 F.
2d, at 45. We granted certiorari to consider a constitutional
question of importance 111 the administra.tion of crimin11J
justice. U. S. - .
II

It may be helpful to clarify at the outset the nature of the
issue in this case. While the prosecutor did not actually
obtain the recidivist indictment until a.fter the plea conferences
had ended, his intention to do so was clearly put forth at the
outset of the plea negotiations. Ha.yes was thus fully informed
of the true terms of the offer when he made his decision to
plead not guilty. This is not a situation, therefore, where
3 According to hi:; own (('~<timon~·. Hayr~ had pleaded guilty in 1961,
when hr war-; 1i yrnrR old, to n chargE' of drtaining a frmule, a leSl>er
'i'ncludrd offrn&' of rapr, nnd ~~~ a re~ult had ~rrvcd fivr year~ in the state
rrformator~· · In HJ70 hr had bren convicted of robbPry and ::;entenced t~· .
five yrnrt~ impri~qnmPnt, but hnd bePn rl'lra:sed on probation immrdia.telr:.
4 'Tne OJ?Inion of thr Di:stcirt Court i:; l:r.JH'e(lot:t~dL
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the prosecutor without notice brought an additional and more
serious charge after plea negotiations relating only to the
original indictment had ended with the defendant's insistence
on pleading not guilty.r· As a practical matter. in short. this
case would be no different if the grand jury had indicted Hayes
as a recidivist from the outset. and the prosecutor had offered
to drop that charge as part of the plea bargain.
The Court of Appea.ls nonetheless drew a distinction between
"concessions relating to prosecution under an existing indictment." and threats to bring more severe charges not contained
in the original indictment--a line it thought necessary in
order to establish a prophylactic rule to guard against the evil
of prosecutorial vindictiveness.{' Quite apart from this chronological distinction, however, the Court of Appeals found that
the prosecutor had acted vindictively in the present case since'
he had conceded that the indictment was influenced by his
desire to induce a guilty plea. 7 The ultimate conclusion of
the Court of Appeals thus seems to have been that a prosecutor
acts vindictively and in violation of due process of law when- ·
r. Compare the presC'nt rase and United States ex l'el. Williams v.
McMann. 436 F. 2d 103 (CA2), with United States v. Ruesga-Ma1iinez,
534 F. 2d 1367, 1370 (CA9).
6 "Althoup;h a. pro~ecutor mar in the cotii'~C' of plC'a 111'goti11tions offer a
def<:>ndnnt, ronre8::>ionR rrlating to prosecut.ion undC'r nn exio<ting indictm<:>nt ... he mn~' not. threaten a defendant with the consequenrrs that
morC' "rverr chnrge>: rna~· bC' brought if hC' insi~ts on p;oing to trial. When
a prosC'cutor obtains nn indictmrnt IC'f'S >'l'vcre than thC' fncts known to him
at the time might permit, hr rna krf: n. discrC'tionary drtermination that the
intf'!'ests of the stntr are served by not sreking more ~erious chargrs. . . .
Accordingly, if aftrr plea negotiations fa.il, he then proemr;; nn indirtmC'nt
charging n. morr R{'riow; crime, n strong infrrenre is created th11.t the only
reason for thr mo11e serious charge,: i,- vindietivenr"'"· Under thr:;e rircumst::mcr,-, the prosecutor should be rrquirrd to justify hi;; action." 547 F.
2d, at 44-45.
7 "In thiH case, a vindictive motive need not br inferred.
The prosecutor
has admitted it." 547 F. 2d, a.t 45.
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ever his charging decision is influenced by what he hopes to
gain in the course of plea bargaining negotiations.

III
We have recently had occasion to observe that "[w]hatever
might be the situation in an ideal world, the fact is that the
guilty plea, and the often concommittant plea bargain are
important components of this country's criminal justice system. Properly administered. they can benefit all concerned."
Blackledge v. Allison, 430 U. S. 63, 71. The open acknowledgment of this previously clandestine practice has led Court
to recognize the importance of counsel during plea negotiations, Brady v. United States, 397 U. S. 742. 758, the need for
a public record indicating that a plea was knowingly and
voluntarily made, Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U. S. 238, 242, and
the requirement that a prosecutor's plea bargaining promise
must be kept. Santobello v. New York, 404 U. S. 257, 262.
The decision of the Court of Appeals in the present case,
however, did not deal with considerations such as these but
held that the substance of the plea offer itself violated the
limitations imposed by the pue Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Cf. Brady v. United States, supra, 397
U. S .. at 751 n. 8. For the reasons that follow, we have concluded that the Court of Appeals was mistaken in so ruling.

IV
This Court held in North Ca.rolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 ,
725, that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment "requires that vindictiveness against a defendant for
having successfully attacked his first conviction must play no
part in the sentence he receives after a new trial. " The same
principle was later applied to prohibit a prosecutor from
reindicting a convicted misdemeanant on a felony charge after
the defenqant had invoked an appellate remedy, since in this

76-1334-0PJNION
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situation there was also a "realistic likelihood of 'vindictiveness.' " Blackledge v. Perry, supra, 417 U. S .. at 27.
In those cases the Court was dealing with the State's
unilateral imposition of a penalty upon a defendant who
had chosen to exercise a legal right to atta~k his original
conviction-a situation "very different from the give-and-take
negotiation common in plea bargaining between the prosecution and the defense. which arguably possess relatively equal
bargaining power." Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U. S. 790,
809 (opinion of BRENN AN. J.). The Court has emphasized that
the due process violation in cases such as Pearce and Perry lay
not in the possibility that a defendant might be deterred from
the exercise of a legal right, see Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U. S.
104; Chaffin v. Stynchcornbe, 412 U. S. 17, but rather in the
danger that the State might be retaliating against the accused
for lawfully attacking his conviction. See Blackledge v. Perry,
supra, 417 U. S.. at 26-28.
To punish a person because he has done what the law pla.inly
allows him to do is a. due process violation of the most basic
sort. see North Carolina v. Pea.rce, supra, 395 U. S., at 738
(opinion of Bla~k. J.). and for an agent of the State to pursue
a course of action whose objective is to penalize a person's
reliance on his legal rights is "patently unconstitutional."
Chaffin v. Stynchcornbe, supra, 412 U.S., at 32-33. n. 20. See
United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570. But in the "give-andtake" of plea bargaining. there is no such element of punishment or retaliation so long as the accused is free to accept or
reject the prosecution's offer.
Plea bargaining
flows from "the mutuality of advantage" to
I
defendants and prosecutors, each with his own reasons for
wanting to avoid trial. Brady v. United States, supra, 397
U. S .. a.t 752. Defendants advised by competent counsel and
protected by other procedural safeguards are presumptively
capable of intelligent choice in response to prosecutorial per·sul,\.siQn, and. unlikely to be driven to falS(> self-condemnation.

76-1334-0PINION
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!d. , at 758.

Indeed, acceptance of the basic legitimacy of plea
bargaining necessarily implies rejection of any notion that a
guilty plea is involuntary in a constitutional sense simply
because it is the end result of the bargaining process. By
hypothesis. the plea may have been induced by promises of a
recommendation of a lenient sentence or a reduction of
charges. anq thus by fear of the possibility of a greater penalty
upon conviction after a trial. See ABA Standa.r ds Relating
to Pleas of Guilty~ 3.1 (1968); Note. Plea Ba.rgaining and the
Transformation of the Criminal Process, 90 Ha.r v. L. Rev. 564
(1977). Cf. Brady v. United States, supra, 397 U.S., at 751;
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25.
While confronting a defendant with the risk of more severe
punishment clearly may have a "discouraging effect on the
defendant's assertion of his trial rights. the imposition of these
difficult choices [is] an inevitable"-and permissible-"attribute of any legitimate system which tolerates and encourages
the negotiation of pleas." Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, supra, 412
U. S .. at 31. It follows that, by tolerating a.nd encouraging
the negotiation of pleas, this Court has necessarily accepted as
constitutionally legitimate the simple reality that the prosecutor's interest at the bargaining table is to persuade the
defendant to forego his right to plead not guilty. Ree generally Alschuler. The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36
U. Chi. L. Rev. 50 (1968).
It is not disputed here that Hayes was properly chargeable
under the recidivist statute, since he had in fact been convicted
of two previous felonies. In our system, so long as the
prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused
committed an offense defined by statute, the decision whether
or not to prosecute. a.nd what charge to file or bring before a
grand jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion.s Within
b This cn;;c doeR noj involve th r constitutional implication;; of a pro;;ecnt.o r',.: offer during plen bargaining of adverHe or lrnient trea tment. for some
pero'On other than the accused, sec ALI Model Code of Pre-Arraignment
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the limits set by the legislature's constitutionally valid defini•
tion of chargeable offenses. "the conscious exercise of some
selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal COJlstitutional violation" so long as "the selection was [not] deliberately
based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race. religion. or
other arbitrary classification." Oyler v. Boles, 368 U. S. 448.
456. To hold that the prosecutor's desire to induce a guilty
plea is an "unjustifiable standard." which. like race or religion,
may play no pa.r t in his charging decision. would contradict
the very premises that underlie the concept of plea bargaining
itself. Moreover. a rigid constitutional rule tha.t would prohibit a prosecutor from acting forthrightly in his dealings with
the defense could only invite unhealthy subterfuge that would
drive the prfl.ctice of plea bargaining back into the shadows
from which it has so recently emerged. See Blackledge v.
Allison, supra, 431 U.S .. at 76.
There is no doubt that the breadth of discretion that our
country's legal system vests in prosecuting attorneys carries
with it the potential for both individual and institutional
abuse." And broad though that discretion ma.y be, there are
undoubtedly constitutional limits upon its exercise. We hold
only that the course of conduct engaged in by the prosecutor
in this case, which no more than openly presented the defendant with the unpleasant alternatives of foregoing trial or facing
charges on which he was pla.inly subject to prosecution, did
Procedure, Commentary 1o § 350.3, pp. 614-615 (1975), which might pose
a greater dangN of inducing 11 fal;;e guilt~· plea by ><kewing the H~<:e~sment.
of the risk>; n defendant mu~t com;idcr. Cf. Bmdy v. United States, 397
U.S. 742, 758.
n Thi,; potential has led to many recommendAtions tlwt the pro~ecutor's
discretion should be controlled b~· meanH of either intrrnal or external
guidrlines. See ALI \fodel Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure § 350.:3
(2)-(3) (Hl75); ABA S1nndard,; Relnting to the Prosecution Function
§§ 2.5. 3.9 (1971); Abrnhm~, Internal Policy: Guiding the Exercise of
Proscrutorial Discretion, 19 UCLA L. Hev. I (1971).
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not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of AppeaJs is
Reversed.
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opinion, I am not satisfied that the result is 'j:U~{' in
this case or that the conduct of the plea

bar~~ining. ,

satisfied the requirements of due process.
Respondent was charged with the uttering of a
single forged check in the amount of $88.30.

Und~r

Kentucky law, this offense was punishable by a prison term
of from two to ten years, apparently without regard to the
amount of the forgery.

During the course of plea

bargaining, the prosecutor offered respondent a sentence
of five years in consideration of a guilty plea.

I

observe, at this point, that five years in prison for the
offense charged hardly could be characterized as an
especially generous offer.

Apparently respondent viewed

the offer in this light

declined to accept

an~

it~

he

protested that he was innocent and insisted on going to
trial.

Respondent adhered to this position even when the

prosecutor advised that he would seek a new indictment
under the state's Habitual Criminal Act which would
subject respondent, if convicted, to a mandatory life
sentence because of two prior felony convictions.
The prosecutor's initial assessment of
respondent's case led him to forego an indictment under
the habitual criminal statute.

The circumstances of

------

L. •

respondent's prior convictions are relevant to this
assessment and to my view of the case.

Respondent was 17

years old when he committed his first offense.

He was

charged with rape but pled guilty to the lesser included
offense of "detaining a female".

One of the other

participants in the incident was sentenced to life
imprisonment.

Respondent was sent not to prison but to a

reformatory where he served five years.
second offense was robbery.

Respondent's

This time he was found guilty

by a jury and was sentenced to five years in prison, but
he was placed on probation and served no time.

The end

result of these two prior convictions, for which
respondent was not imprisoned, and conviction on a charge
involving

$88.3~

was a mandatory sentence of life

imprisonment. Although respondent's prior convictions
brought him within the terms of the Habitual Criminal Act,
the offenses themselves apparently were not
serious enough to result in imprisonment.

But now,

conviction on a charge involving $88.30 resulted in a
mandatory sentence of imprisonment for life.l

Persons

convicted of rape and murder often are not punished so
severely.
No explanation appears in the record for the
prosecutor's decision to escalate the charge against
respondent other than respondent's refusal to plead
guilty.

The prosecutor has conceded that his purpose was

to discourage respondent's assertion of constitutional

3.
rights, and the majority accepts this characterization of
events.

See ante, at 2 n. 1, 7.
It seems to me that the question to be asked

under the circumstances is whether the prosecutor
reasonably might have charged respondent under the
Habitual Criminal Act in the first place.

The deference

that courts properly accord the exercise of a prosecutor's
discretion perhaps would foreclose judicial criticism if
the prosecutor originally had sought an indictment under
that act, as unreasonable as it would have seemed. 2
But here the prosecutor evidently made a reasonable,
responsible judgment not to subject an individual to a
mandatory life sentence when his only new offense had
societal implications as limited as the uttering of a
single $88 forged check and when the circumstances of his
prior convictions confirmed the inappropriateness of
applying the habitual criminal statute.

3

I think it

may be inferred that the prosecutor himself deemed it
unreasonable and not in the public interest to put this
defendant in jeopardy of·a sentence of life imprisonment.
There may be many situations in which a
prosecutor would be fully justified in seeking a fresh
indictment for a more serious offense.

The most plausible

justification might be that it would have been reasonable
and in the public interest initially to have charged the
defendant with the greater offense.

In most cases a court

could not know why the harsher indictment was sought, and

4.

-

an inquiry into the prosecutor's motive would be as
inappropriate as it likely would be unfruitful.
cases, I would agree with the majority

th~t

In these

the situation

would not differ materially from one in which the higher
charge was brought at the outset.

See ante at 4.

But this is not such a case.

Here, any inquiry

into the prosecutor's purpose is made unnecessary by his
candid acknowledgment that he "threatened" to procure and
in fact procured the habital criminal indictment because
of respondent's insistence on exercising his
constitutional rights.

We have stated in unequivocal

terms, in discussing United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S.
570 (1968), and North Carolina v. Pearce, 395

u.s.

711

(1969), that "Jackson and Pearce are clear and subsequent
cases have not diluted their force:

if the only objective

of a state practice is to discourage the assertion of
constitutional rights it is 'patently
unconstitutional.'""
32 n. 20 (1973).

Chaffin v. Stynchcornbe, 412 U.S. 17,

And in Brady v. United States, 397 U.S.

742 (1970), we drew a distinction between the situation
there approved and the "situation where the prosecutor or
judge, or both, deliberately employ their charging and
sentencing powers to induce a particular defendant to
tender a plea of guilty."

Id., at 751 n. 8.

I would affirm the opinion of the Court of
Appeals on the facts of this case. The plea bargaining
process, as recognized by this Court, is essential to the
functioning.of the criminal justice system.

It normally

affords genuine benefits to defendants as well as to
society. And if the system is to work effectively,
prosecutors must be accorded the widest discretion, within
constitutional limits, in conducting bargaining.
2, supra.

Cf. note

This is especially true when a defendant is

represented by counsel and presumably is fully advised
ofhis rights.

Only in the most exceptional case should a

court conclude that the scales of the bargaining are so
unevenly balanced as to arouse suspicion.

In this case,

the prosecutor's actions denied respondent due process
because their admitted purpose was to discourage and then
to penalize with unique severity his exercise of
constitutional rights. Implementation of a strategy
calculated solely to deter the exercise of constitutional
rights is not a constitutionally permissible exercise of
discretion.

I therefore dissent.

FOOTNOTES
1.

It is suggested that respondent will be

eligible for parole consideration after serving 15 years.
2.

The majority suggests that this case cannot

be distinguished from the case where the prosecutor
initially obtains an indictment under an enhancement
statute and later agrees to drop the enhancement charge in
exchange for a guilty plea.

I would agree that these two

situations are alike only if it were assumed that the
hypothetical prosecutor's decision to charge under the
enhancement statute was occasioned not by consideration of
the public interest but by a strategy to discourage the
defendant from exercising his constitutional rights.
theory, I would condemn both practices.

In

In practice, the

hypothetical situation is largely unreviewable.

The

majority's view confuses the propriety of a particular
exercise of prosecutorial discretion with its
unreviewability.

In the instant case, however, we have no

problem of proof.
3.

Indeed, the Kentucky legislature subsequently

determined that the habitual criminal statute under which
respondent was convicted swept too broadly and did not
identify adequately the kind of prior convictions that
should trigger its application.

At least one of

respondent's two prior convictions would not satisfy the
criteria of the revised statute; and the impact of the

N-2
statute, when applied, has been reduced significantly in
situations, like this one, where the third offense is
relatively minor.

See ante, at 2 n. 2.
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MR. JusTICE PowELL, dissenting.
Although I agree with much of the Court's opinion , I am
not satisfied that the result in this case is just or that the
conduct of the plea bargaining met the requirements of due
process.
Respondent was charged with the uttering of a single forged
check in the amount of $88.30. Under Kentucky law, this
offense was punishable by a prison term of from two to 10
years, apparently without regard to the amount of the forgery.
During the course of plea bargaining, the prosecutor offered
respondent a sentence of five years in consideration of a guilty
plea. I observe, at this point, that five years in prison for the
offense charged hardly could be characterized as a generous
offer. Apparently respondent viewed the offer in this light
and declined to accept it; he protested that he was innocent
and insisted on going to trial. Respondent adhered to this
position even when the prosecutor advised that he would seek
a 1ww indictment under the State's Habitual Criminal Act
which would subject respondent. if convicted , to a mandatory
life sentence because of two prior felony convictions.
The prosecutor's initial assessment of respondent's case led
him to forego an indictment under the habitual criminal
statute. The circumstances of respondent's prior convictions
~re relevant to this assessment and to my view of the casc:;·.
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Respondent was 17 years old when he committed his first
offense. He was charged with rape but pled guilty to the
lesser included offense of "detaining a female." One of the
other participants in the incident was sentenced to life imprisonment. Respondent was sent not to prison but to a reformatory where he served five years. Respondent's second offense
was robbery. This time he was found guilty by a jury and
was sentenced to five years in prison, but he was placed on
probation and served no time. Although respondent's prior
convictions brought him within the terms of the Habitual
Criminal Act, the offenses themselves did not result in
imprisonment; yet the addition of a conviction on a charge
involving $88.30 subjected respondent to a mandatory sentence of imprisonment for life. 1 Persons convicted of rape
and murder often are not punished so severely.
No explanation appears in the record for the prosecutor's
decision to escalate the charge against respondent other than
respondent's refusal to plead guilty. The prosecutor has conceded that his purpose was to discourage respondent's assertion
of constitutional rights, and the majority accepts this characterization of events. See ante, at 2 n. 1, 7.
It seems to me that the question to be asked under the
circumstances is whether the prosecutor reasonably might
have charged respondent under the Habitual Criminal Act in
the first place. The deference that courts properly accord the
exercise of a prosecutor's discretion perhaps would foreclose
judicial criticism if the prosecutor originally had sought an
indictment under that act, as unreasonable as it would have
seemed. 2 But here the prosecutor evidently made a reasonIt. is suggested that respondent. will be eligible for parole con cideration
after serving 15 years.
2 ThC' mnjorit~· ~uggC':;ts, ante, nt 4, t.hat this case cannot hP di:;tinguishecl
from the ea;;p whC're t hP prosecutor initially obtains an indictmPnt under
nn C'nhnncempnt ~>tntute a11d later agrPPs to drop the Pn11an.cemPnt. churge
:in cxch,'lngC' for n gnnilty· plea, I would ag-ree th.at the.,e two ~ituationfl:
1
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ab1e. responsible judgment not to subject an individual to a
mandatory lifr sentence when his only new offense had societal
implications as limited as those accompanying the uttering of
a single $88 forged chrck and when the circumstances of his
prior convictions confirmed the inappropri~teness of applying
the habitual criminal statute." I think it may be inferred
that the prosecutor himself deemed it unreasonable and not
in the public interest to put this defendant in jeopardy of a
sentencr of life imprisonment.
There may be situations in which a prosecutor would be
fully justified in seeking a fresh indictment for a more serious
offense. The most pl~tusible justification might be that it
would have been reasonable and in the public interest initially
to have charged the defendant with the greater offense. In
most cases a court could not know why the harsher indictment
was sought. and an inquiry into the prosecutor's motive would
neither be indicated nor likely to be fruitful. In those case,
I would agree with the majority that the situation would not
differ materially from one in which the higher charge was
brought at the outset. See ante, at 4.
But this is not such a case. Here, any inquiry into the
would br nlike oulu if it were n;;:sumed that the hypothetical prosecutor'::;
decision to chnrgf'. under the enhnncemrnt statute was occa:sioned not by
ronsiderntion of thr public 'intere~t but by a strategy to di:scourage the
defendant from exercising hi;; constitutionaJ rights. In theory, I would
condemn both practic<'>'. In practice, the hypotheficnl situntion is largely
unreviewnble. The major'ity''s view confuses fhe propriety of n particular
rxercib-e of prosrrutorinl cti:scretion with its unrrviewability. In the
im;tnnt cnl:!<', howrvrr, wr hnve no problem of proof.
9 Ind<>cd, thr K<>nturk~· Legislature subsequently determined that the
'habitual criminal :stat.u1t>'tmifer which rcxpondent was convicted swept too
broad!~· nnd did not idrn'tify adequately the kind of prior convictions that
should trigger it~ applic11tion. At least one of respondent's two prior
conviction:,; would not. ~atisfy the criteria of the revised statute; and the
impnct of thr statute, whrn applied, ha:s been reduced significantly in
situations. like thi::; one, where the third offense is relatively minor. s~.
•ante, at 2 n. ~...
·
·
·
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prosecutor's purpose is made unnecessary by his candid
acknowledgement that he threatened to procure and in fact
procured the habitual criminal indictment because of respondent's insistence on exercising his constitutional rights. We
have stated in unequivocal terms, in discussing United States
v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968). B;nd North Ca.rolina v. Pearce,
395 U. S. 711 ( 196~)). that "Jackson and Pearce are clear and
subsequent cases have not diluted their force: if the only
objective of a state practice is to discourage the assertion .
of constitutional rights it is 'patently unconstitutional.' "
Chaffi:n v. Stynchcombe, 412 U. S. 17, 32 n. 20 (1973). And
in Brady v. United States, 397 U. S. 742 (1970), we drew a
distinction between the situation there approved and the
"situation where the prosecutor or juflge. or both, deliberately
employ their charging and sentencing powers to induce a particular defendant to tender a plea of guilty." !d., at 751 n. 8.
The plea-bargaining process. as recognized by this Court. is
essential to the functioning of the cri1ninal-justice system. It
normally affords genuine benefits to defendants as well as to
society. And if the system is to work effectively, prosecutors
must be accorded the widest discretion, within constitutional
limits, in conducting bargaining. Cf. n. 2. supra. This is
especially true when a defendant is represented by counsel and
presumably is fully advised of his rights. Only in the most
exceptional case should a court conclude that the scales of the
bargaining arc so unevenly balapced as to arouse suspicion.
In this case. the prosecutor's actions denied respondent due
process because their admitted p~rpose was to discourage and
then to penalize with unique severity his exercise of constitu~
tional rights. Implementation of a strategy calculated solely
to deter thC' exercise of constitutional rights is not a constitu~
tionally permissible exercise of discretion. I would affirm the
'Opinion of tlw Court of Appeals on the facts of this case ..
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